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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.
12527

JERRY LEE ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, Jerry Lee Anderson, appeals from
aconriction of murder in the first degree.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\iVER COURT
A jury found the appellant guilty of murder in the
: first <le gree on January 7, 1971 in the Third Judicial
: District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of
: rtah. The appellant was thereafter sentenced to a term
i .{ iife imprisonment at the Utah State Prison.
!
i
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the
district court should be affirmed.
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
On August 16, 1970, Charles Gustafson was shot
five times and killed by the defendant-appellant Jerry
Lee Anderson. Gustafson had been an acquaintence of
the Appellant's for approximately four days. (R. 300.)
They had been together the night of August 15, 1970.
and the early morning of August 16, H)70, frequenting
various taverns. (R. 277-283). l\1r. Gustafson drore
appellant home at approximately 6 :30 a.m. on August
16, 1970. The killing occurred shortly thereafter. Ap·
pellant testified that he had not been in a fight with the
deceased ( R. 249) and that he got along well with the
deceased and had no reason to expect trouble from him.
( R. 301). The appellant further testified that there
were no angry words between himself and the deceased
when he got out of the car. (R. 226).
Appellant's neighbors were awakened early in the
morning of August 16, 1970 by the sound of shots (R.
105, 106) and when they looked out the window of their

home they saw the appellant trying to put the victim in
the trunk of a car. (R. 116). They called the police who
arrived shortly thereafter.
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,\s the appellant was attempting to pull the victim
illto the garage the police approached him. Appellant
testified that he saw a movement which he thought was
·more people trying to get him" and pointed a gun at
officer Cardwell. ( R. 294, 295, 133). Officer l\iitchell
!iad his gun on the appellant and after requesting ap1wllant to <lrop his gun the appellant was arrested and
hmckuffed. (R. 150) .
. Appellant testified that he did not immediately
see that it was police officers who were approaching
him. ( R. 294) . The officers testified that their uniforms were distinctive and they had bright yellow arm
pat\'hes. ( R. 70, 132). At his booking the appellant
stated that the reason he pointed his gun at Officer
Cardwell was that he had killed one man and it didn't
make any difference if he killed another. (R. 249).
The appellant made several statements in an attempt to explain the circumstances surrounding the killing. At one time the appellant stated that he shot Gustafson because Gustaf son had pulled a gun on him. In
another conversation with Officer Luker at the jail the
Jppcllant said that he (the appellant) pulled a gun first
hut that Gustafson had also pulled a gun. (R. 255). At

trial the appellant testified that as he got out of the
tar to go into his house he heard l\fr. Gustafson say

rm1ething like "I've got to you now" or "I won't miss

1

now," (R. 314), and he turned and saw Mr. Gustafson
pointing a gun at him. (R. 288).
Earlier on August 15, 1970, the appellant stated
to others that he was going to kill some men if he could
fi1Hl them. (R. 308). Appellant denied that one of the
·11en he had vowed to kill was the victim l\Ir. Gustafson.
(R. 308).

There was another gun found in the front seat of
the victim's car and the victim's wallet was on the back
seat. ( R. 153, 215) . There was not a round in the chamber of the gun but there was a full clip. (R. 153, 161).
The gun fuond in the car, had not been fired. (R. 163).
The victim's wallet had no money in it and all of
the snaps to the various compartments were opened.
(Tl. 216) . Both of the rear pockets and the right front
·:ocket of the victim's trousers had been turned inside
ont by the appellant. (R. 214).
The driveway onto which the victim fell after he
was shot was composed of dirt and gravel and there
was evidence of gravel and dirt in the mouth of the
victim. (R. 213). The appellant testified that he picked
the victim's gun and wallet up off the ground, where
they had fall en from the decedant's possession, and
threw them in the car along with his (appellant's) shirt.
( R. 295) . There was no evidence of any dirt or dust or
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fore:gn substance on the gun taken from the front seat.

(n. 3.37).

Appellant testified that he did not call the police as
he did not get along with them and inasmuch as he had
been corl\'icted of several felonies he did not think that
the poli('e would believe his story ( R. 299) . Appellant
did not mention to e;ther his neighbor Gene Smith ( R.
or to his grandmother ( R. 329) that he had shot a
man in self defense.
The victim received $385.00 on August 13, 1970,
three days prior to his death. (R. 226, 227). One of the
Appellant's witnesses testified that the victim had approximately $1400.00 in his possession on August 14,
1970. ( R. 270).

Appellant's grandmother testified that the Appelland had lived with her for the past two and one-half
months, and that he did not pay room or board. (H.
126). She also testified that he had not had any work.
m. 123). She had given him some money for helping
around the home (R. 126) and $250.00 0n July 9, 1970,
[o help the Appellant purchase a car. (R. 126).
At the time of his arrest the Appellant had approximately $111.00 in cash in his possession and a check.
iR. 24<1). Three twenty-dollar bills were in his wallet
a11d the rest of the money was loose in his front pockets.
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(R. 245, 246). T"-o of the bills taken from the Appellant's front pockets had blood on them. (R. 245).
The Appellant was asked, by his counsel on direct
examination, how much money he had in his possession
at the time of his arrest. (R. 298). The Appellant answered:
"Approximately, yes-not within a dollar
or bvo, but ·with the money and a check that was
in my possession between $350.00 and
$400.00." (R. 298).

The check to which Appellant referred was introduced
into evidence without objection as Exhibit 35 and was
made for the amount of $169.24. (R. 247).
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR
IN REQUIRING APPELLANT TO ANSvVER
QUESTIONS ABOUNT A CHECK FOUND IN
HIS POSSESSION AT THE TilVlE OF HIS
ARREST AS TIIE CHECK vVAS PROPERLY
INTO EVIDENCE WITHOUT
OBJECTION BY APPELLANT'S COUNSEL;
WAS A SUBJECT :MATTER OF APPEL
LANT'S RESPONSES ELICITED ON DIRECT
AND WAS THEREFOR A PROPER SUBJECT OF CROSS-EX·

7

Al\IIN A TI ON vVITH '\THI CH THE APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY C 0 UL D BE IMPEACHED AND HIS CREDIBILITY
ATTACKED.
The Appellant had in his possession a check payable to him in the sum of $169.24 from Gary Greenburg Service at the time of his arrest. (R. 247, 350).
The cheek was removed from the Appellant's wallet at
the time of his arrest by Officer Luker. It was introtluced as State Exhibit 35 without objection by Appellant's counsel. (R. 247). The Appellant was asked by
his own counsel, on direct examination, as to the amount
of money he had in his possession at the time of his arrest. (R. 298). The Appellant responded:
"Approximate]y, yes-not within a dollar or two, but with the money and a check that
was in my possession, between $350.00 and
$400.00." (R. 298).
The check was the subject of cross-examination
OYer the objection of Appellant's counsel. (R. 350).
Appellant was asked if he received the check from Gary
Gree11burg to which he replied no. (R. 3lH). Appellant
was also asked if he had ever told Office!' Luker, in an
attempt to explain his possession of the check, that he
ha(l worked for Gary Greenburg. (R. 3.51). Appellant
answered that he had never stated that fact. (R. 351,
332).
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On rebuttal, Officer Luker testified that when
questioned at the time of his arrest regarding the larue
b
amount of money in his possession, the Appellant explained that the check vms in receipt for work which he
had done for Gary Greenburg Service. Gary Greenburg
was also called as a rebuttal witness and testified that
the .i\.ppellant had never worked for him. (R. 362).
On appeal, the Appellant contends that testimony
surrounding the check violated his privilege against
self-incrimination. The check, however, was a fact in
evidence and its subject matter was a proper topic for
cross-examination. Clearly, the only purpose for which
the testimony of the check was introduced was to attack the credibility of the Appellant. None of the questions the Appellant was asked directly connected the
Appellant with the crime of forgery. Appellant was
not asked whether he had stolen blank checks from Garr
Greenburg Service, nor 'vhether he had forged the
signature of Gary Greenburg on the check in his pos·
session. Neither Gary Greenburg nor Officer Luker
testified that the Appellant had done these actions. The
only purpose of the testimony involving the check was
to impeach the Appellant's earlier testimony and attack
his credibility.

T'V igmore on Evidence 3rd. Ed. ( 1940) Section
1368 p. 33 states that the fundamental feature of cross
examination:

!
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..... is that a witness, on his direct examination, discloses but a part of the necessary
facts. That which remains suppressed or undeveloped may be of two sorts, (a) the remaining and qualifying circumstances of the subject of testimony as known to the witness, and
( h) the facts which diminish the personal trustzcort hiness of the witness." (Emphasis supplied.)
I 11 TV eber Basin f'V ater Conservancy District v.
Ward, 10 U.2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959) this court held
that one of the purposes of cross examination was to
test the credibility of the witness.

"The purpose of cross-examination is to
give adversary counsel the opportunity not
only to inquire into uncertainties relating to the
testimony in chief, hut to test its credibility.
1Vhatel'er may tend to explain, modify or contradict that direct e·L'idence should be alllowed."
Id. at 33. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Appellant cites 1llalloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
i l\)64<) awl JI off man v. U.S., 341 U.S. 479 ( 1951) for
the proposition that the answers illicited from him on
,,iolated his privilege against self11wrin1ination. Clearly, those cases are easily distinguishiiilt" from the instant case on their facts. In Hoffman,
:1(" !d'endant was cor1"icted of criminal contempt for
'' ! i 1si11g to obey a f e<leral court order requiring him to
1
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answer certain questions asked in a grand jury investi.
gation. The questions asked the defendant could easily
have required answers that would have forged links in a
chain of facts imperiling the defendant with conviction
of a federal crime.
In the instant case, the Appellant was only asked
whether or not he had ever made a statement to the arresting officer that he had worked for Gary Greenburg
Service in an attempt to explain his possession of a check
from the service station. The amount of money in Ap·
pellant's possession was crucial to the state's case in
establishing the crime of first degree murder. Appel·
lant was not required to take the stand as a witness in
his own behalf but he did so voluntarily.
In State v. Brown, 16 U.2d 57", 895 P.2d 72i
( 1964) this court stated:
"The defense could either claim the privilege or waive it, whichever it thought would
be to its best advantage. But it could not engage in half way measures by waiving the
privilege and obtaining the benefit of having
her testify and still claim some of the protection refusal to testify affords. As we pointed
out in the former case, if the privilege is
claimed it should be scrupulously protected. But
when it is waived, it is done away with just as
though it did not exist, and the witness is then
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in the same status and subject to the same
treatment as any other witness, no more and
no less. This includes being subject to crossexamination." Id. at 59.
Similarly, TYigrnore on Evidence 3rd Ed., (1940)
Section 2276 ( 2) pp. 440-441 states:
" ( 2) The case of an accused in a criminal
trial, who voluntarily takes the stand, is different. Here his privilege has protected him
from being asked even a single question, for
the reason that no relevant fact could be inquired about that would not tend to criminate
h;m ... On this very hypothesis, then, his voluntary offer of testimony upon any fact is a
wai,Ter as to all other relevant facts, because
of the necessary connection between all. IIis
situation is distinct from that of the ordinary
witness. with reference to the point of time
when a waiver can be predicted, because the
ordinary witness is compelled to take the stand
in the first instance, and his opportunity for
ehoice does not come till later, when some part
of the criminating fact is asked for, while the
accused has the choice at the outset.
The above provisions are dispositive of Appellant's
allegations. In J1f alloy and JI of fman supra, the accused
diJ not 'Toluntarily take the witness stand but, on the
,·,mtrary, were subpoenaed to testify before a referee
: 11il grau<l jury respectively. An accused who takes the
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stand as a witness in his own defense, thereby places his
character and credibility in issue.
The Supreme Court of New ·Mexico in State v.
Holden, 45 N.l\I. 147, 113 P.2d 171 (1941) stated:
" ... [T]he fact that competent evidence
on the issue of a defendant's credibility may
tend to prejudice him, does not alone exclude
it. Undoubtedly, the tendency of al1 evidence
impeaching the character of the accused as a
witness is to prejudice him as the defendant.
Th:s is one of the hazards he accepts when he
presents himself as a witness in his own behalf." Id. at 179.
In State ti. .Johnson, 25 U.2d 160, 478 P.2d 491
(1970) th's court stated that:
"The law appears clear that evidence of
other crimes is not admissable if its sole pudpose is to disgrace the defendant as a person
of evil character with a propensity to commit
the crime charged. The situation is quite different where the evidence concerning another
crime comes in as an integral part of evidence
which is competent and relevant to the charge
upon which he is being tried, such as the conversation in question." Id. at 162.
In the instant case, the check was competent ano
relevant evidence. It was in his possession at the time ol
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bis arrest. The sole purpose for which it was introduced

.as to impeach the Appellant's testimony and attack
his rredibility. It was not introduced to disgrace the defendant as a person of evil character with a propensity
to commit er.me. The Appellant, on direct examination,
ndmitted to having been convicted of more than one
felony ( R. 276) and that one of the reasons he didn't
call the police after he killed Gustafson was that he had
had "numerous dealings with the officers in their line
uJ' <l11ty since approximately 1953 and I realized with
my record, being an ex-convict, I wouldn't stand a
chance." ( R. 292) .

1

"It is the mandate of our law, and the
policy declared by our statute, that a conviction
mmld not be reversed merely for any charged
error or irregularity but only if there is one
which is substantial and prejudicial in the
sense that there is a reasonable likelihood of a
different result in its absence." Id. at 162.
Evidence of the check did not unduly prejudice the
Appellant.
Iu State v. llansen. 22 U.2d 63, 448 P.2d 720
1HlG8), Cert den. 394 U.S. 992, this court quoted

farorably from 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses Section 689 p.
373,

"'¥here the defendant in a criminal case
as a witness, his veracity and credibil-
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ity may be tested by cross-examination as other
witnesses may be tested. The accused may be
cross-examined for the purpose of impeaching
his testimony, for h;s credibility is in issue when
he offers himself as a vvitness, and this is true
regardless of the rule adopted in regard to his
cross-examination as to matters not covered by
his direct examination. ***" Id. at 65.
In I-I ansen, as in the instant case, the cross-examination
did not go beyond the general scope of matters coverea
by the direct examination.
"On cross-examination the prosecution had
the right to elicit anything which would tend
not only to contradict the evidence adduced on
direct examination, but which would tend to
weaken or modify its effect. To hold otherwise than that the ruling of the court was correct would amount to too narrow a construction
of the scope of the direct examination." Id. at
66.

This court also stated in "il'lorton v.
484, 143 P.2d 434 (1943) that:

105 Utan

"Since the purpose of a trial is to disclose
the truth and receive competent proof of material and relevant facts, we do not believe a
witness either intentionally or unintentionally
should be permitted to prevent disclosure of
material facts nor to evaJe impeachment by refusing to answer, or merely to say that he does
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not remember. If permitted to function, a con\'enient memory could readily defeat proof of
prior contradictory statements and testimony
giYcll at a time when the witness would be more
likely to remember how things happened with
a greater degree of accuracy." Id. at 492.
It is not an infringement of an accused's constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination to
eross-examine him as to matters to which he has testified to on direct examination, or which are connected
therewith. J\ ppellant should not be allowed to avail himself of the objection that the evidence may incriminate
him. In State v. Jlundell, 66 Ida. 297, 158 P.2d 818
( Hl45) the Supreme Court of Idaho stated:
"The rule would seem to be well settled
that where a defendant in a criminal trial voluntarily takes the witness stand in his own behalf he is subject to the same rules applicable
to other witnesses and may be cross-examined
in regard to all connected therewith." Id. at
822.

The Court of Appeals in Oklahoma similarly ruled
in rVilliamson v. State, 640 Cr. 94, 77 P.2d II93 ( 1938)
that:

"There is no sound reason why a defendant who voluntarily becomes a witness in his
O\\ n behalf should not be subjected to the
same rule applied to other witnesses with ref-
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erence to cross-examination. He should weigh
the consequences and determine the result before he goes upon the witness stand. If he is
unable to withstand the cross-examination by
reason of statements he has made, or evidence
he has given at a former hearing, it is his privilege to not present himself as a witness and be
subjected to cross-examination. It therefore
follows that the constitutional rights of the
defendant have not been violated while on crossexamination, to interrogate him with reference
to the statements or evidence which he has given, where such statements or evidence tends to
impeach or discredit him." Id. at 1196.

In Jones v. Staie, 453 P.2d 393 (1969) Court of :
Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, the defendant was
charged with first degree rape. On appeal, the defend·
ant alleged in part that the trial court committed error
in its failure to declare a mistrial because of the conduct '
of the county attorney. The county attorney's conduct
included fanning a number of alledgedly bogus ehecks
before the jury. The court stated that the defendant
did not object to the waiving of the checks and then
'vent on to say:
''The defendant did object to questioning
by the state as to defendant's bad checks, where
there was no criminal conviction. However, the
defendant took the stand and testif;ed in his
own behalf and attempted to establish his
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former good character and conduct. Therefore,
the question of passing bogus checks was properly before the jury. The defendant had put his
truth and veracity in issue and he cannot complain if his credibility is questioned." Id. at 397.
In the instant case, the Appellant likewise took the
and attempted to establish his theory of the killing. Inasmuch as his defense was self-defense his character and credibility were certainly issues properly before the jury and subject to attack. The check, properly
!ntroduce<l into evidence and having been a subject of
direct exam;nation, was a proper subject of cross-examination upon which the appellant could be impeached
and his credibility attacked.
In State v. Griffcth, 481 P.2d 34 ( 1971), the Supreme Court of Idaho stated that:
"It is clear that when an accused takes the
stand in his own defense, he is automatically
subject to impeachment the same as any other
witness, and his or her credibility is an issue in
all instances." Id. at 40.

The Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Osburn,
171 Kan 330, 232 P.2d 451 ( 1951), held that:
" ... there can be no question about the status
arnl rights of a defendant in a criminal action
\rhere he elects to take the stand as a witness
in his own defense. When he does so he places
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his character and credibility in issue and when
questioned in good faith, he may l)(: cross-e.vamined •a:ith the 1:iew of impairing his credibility concerning pre·cious of'fenses and subjects involr:ing hirn in degradation and disgrace
although they do not pertain to the charge for
7.t hich he is then on trial. "ill ore than that the
extent of the cross-ecr:amination touching his
credibility is a matter which rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court and ruling."l with respect thereto "lc:ill not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing that discretion has
been abused." Id. at 454 (Emphasis supplied.)
1

The lower court did not abuse its discretion in al
lowing testimony concerning the check found in tlF
Appellant's possession at the time of his arrest. Eri·
dence as to independent and disconnected criminal ach.
may be receiYed for the specific purpose of affecting i
the credibility of the accused if its effect upon credi·
bility is not too remote, if its probative value is not out·;I
weighed by the risk that its admission will necessitate I
undue consumption of time or create a substantial dang-!
er of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or c.i ·
misleading the jury. 29 Arn Jur 2d. Witnesses Secti(lii,
327 p. 378.
1

I

Appellant also contends that the testimony of Gan:
Greenburg as a rebuttal witness was improper. In Stal •
v. Alexander, 78 "\,\Tyo. 324, 324 P.2d 831 (19.58) th

!
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:-lupreme Court of \Vyoming held that "['f]he eourt's
detenninat:on of what is properly rebutting evidence
should Le respected and, furthermore ... such rebuttal
is always admissible to impeaeh, and, we add, to contradict the defendant, opponent or his witnesses." Id. at
889.

In 1.'1'tate v. J(uhnley, 74 Ariz 10, 11 242 P.2d 843,
849 (IU52) the Supreme Court of Arizona held that the
state may offer any competent evidence which is a direct
reply to or a contradiction of any material evidence introduced by the accused even though it may tend to prove
another offense or strengthen the prosecution's case.
The Supreme Court of California in People v. Burton,
55 C.2d 328, 359 P.2d 433, 445 ( 1961) held that rebuttal evidence may be used to impeach a witness or attack his credibility. Accordingly, the testimony of Gary
Greenburg and Officer Luker as rehuttal witnesses
was proper in that it impeached the accused's former
testimony and attacked his credibility.
Appellant does not cite any case which is comparable to the circumstances and fads surrounding the instant case. The Appellant voluntarily took the witness
stand and opened his testimony and character to attack.
The court below did not error in requiring Appellant to
answer question about a check found in his possession at
the time of his arrest as the check was properly admitted
into e\·idence without objection by the Appellant; was
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a subject of the accused's responses on direct examination and was therefore a proper subject of cross exam.
ination with which the credibility of the Appellant could
be a ttacke<l and his testimony impeached.

!

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS
A VERDICT OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER.

i
I

In virtually all cases involving review of the suf.
ficiency of the evidence on appeal, this court has held
that it is the prerogative of the jury to judge the credi·
bility of the witnesses and to determine the facts; and •
that the evidence will be reviewed in the light most far- .
arable to the verdict. \Vhen it appears that the jury /
acted fairly and reasonably the verdict will not be dis· i
turbed. See State v. TVard, 10 U. 2d 34, 347 P. 2d 865
( 1959) : State v. Sinclair, 15 U. 2d 162, 389 P. 2d 465
( 1964); State v. Harnilton, 18 U. 2d 234, 419 P. 2d 770 I
(1966).
/
I

The language of this court in State V· Canfield, 181
U. 2d 292, 422 P. 2d ( 1967) is applicable to the instant
i
case.
1

"Defendant's case is presented in the all too
common manner of defense counsel: Arguing
from his own theory of the evidence that it does
not show the necessary intent to justify the
verdict. But this is at variance with the correct
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pattern of procedure on appeal and paints
quite a different picture of this case than we
are obliged to see. It is our duty to respect the
prerogative of the jury as the exclusive judges
of the credibility of the witnesses and as the
determiners of the facts. Consequently, we assume that they believed the States' evidence,
and we survey it, together with all fair inferenees that the jury could reasonably draw therefrom, in the light most favorable to their verdict." Id. at 294.
The evidence in the case at hand is clearly within the
ambit of the rules established by this court, and clearly
supports a verdict and conviction of murder in the first
degree.
The record is clear that the appellant had been out
of work for some time and was living with his grandmother. The appellant did not pay his grandmother
rent or board. ( R. 113, 126). He had received some
money from her for helping around the home (R. 126)
and $250.00 on July 9, 1970 (R. 126) to help purchase
a car. The appellant had not arranged to purchase a car.
(R. 120). At the time of his arrest the appellant had
approximately $111·00 in cash in his possession and a
cherk ( R. 241) . Three twenty dollar bills were in his
wallet and the rest of the money was loose in his front
11orkets. ( R. 245, 246). There was blood on two of the
hills taken from the appellant's front pocket. (R. 245).
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The victim received $385.00 on August 13, 1970,
three days prior to his death. (R. 226, 227). One of the
appellant's witnesses testified that the victim had approximately $1400.00 in his possession on August 14,
1970. (R. 270). The victim's wallet had no money in it
and all the snaps to the various compartments were
opened. ( R. 216) . Both of the rear pockets and the right
front pocket of the victims trousers had been turned
inside out by the appellant. (R. 214) ·
The appellant testified that he picked up the victim's gun and wallet off the ground from where they
had fallen and threw them in the car along with his (ap·
pellant's shirt. ( R. 295). Though the ground on which
the victim was killed was gravel and dirt and the victim
had gravel and dirt in his mouth ( R. 213) there was no
evidence of any dirt or dust or foreign substance on the
gun ( R. 357) nor was there any evidence introduced
which showed that there was any dirt or dust on the
wallet.
On August 15, 1970, the appellant stated to others
that he was going to kill some men if he could find them.
(R. 308). Appellant denied that one of the men he had

vowed to kill was the victim l\ir. Gustafson. (R. 308).
Appellant's own testimony reveals that the appellant
had not been in a fight with the victim (R. 249) and
that he got along well with the deceased and had

fi(1
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rcnson to expect trouble from him. (R. 301). The ap-

pe1lant further testified that there were no angry words
betffcen himself and the deceased when he got out of
!he car and he had no reason to expect any trouble. (R.
226).

Appellant further testified that on var10us occas:ons the victim had asked to borrow $100.00 but that
:ippellant ref used which may have irritated the victim.
(R. 284, 285). However, it is difficult to understand
appellant's contention that a man would need to borrow
when three days earlier he had $385.00 in cash,
in the bank, and who two days earlier had been
seen "·ith $1400.00 (R. 226, 227, 228, 270) would be in
neecl of borrowing $100.00 from the appellant.
The appellant made several attempts to explain
the incriminating evidence and the conflicts on his various statements surrounding the crime. Even a cursory
reriew of the transcript re,·eals that the evidence and
testimony of the state and its witnesses refuted every
possible theory of the killing that the appellant proposed. The appellant's credibility was successfully attac·ke!l and his testimony consistently impeached. It is
clear that the jury could have easily concluded that the
killing took place under either of the theories upon which
tlie state prosecuted. Little, if any, of the evidence and
introduced at the trial supports the appellants
·ersion as to how the killing took place.

24

A review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict clearly reveals that the jury acteJ
fairly and reasonably in finding the defendant gu;lty
beyond a reasonable doubt of murder in the first degree.
"The defendant had had all the law entitled
him to; a full and fair opportunity, with the
aid of competent counsel, to present his case
to a jury of his fellow citizens. They have indicated by their verdict that they unanimously believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was guilty of murder ... ·" State v. Canfield,
18

u. 2d 292, 297.

The verdict of the jury should be affirmed.

POINT III
TI-IE COCRT DID NOT EHR IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION CONCERNING THE RIGHTS
OF ONE TO ARl\1 I-IIl\ISELF IN ADV.ANCE
IF HE ANTICIPATES THE NEED FOR
SELF-DEFENSE.
Appellant cites 41 C.J.S. Homicide Section 378
( c) ( 4) for the proposition that if the court restricts
the issue of self-defense by submitting the issue of who
was the provocator, it must submit an instruction on
arming oneself in advance. Section 378 (a) ( 4), however, clearly states that:

i

I
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" . it should also instruct the jury as to accused's right to arm himself in anticipation of
danger, and, where such an instruction is warranted by the evidence, a refusal to give it
constitutes error. Such an instruction, however,
is neither
nor proper where such an
issue is not raised by the evidence in the case,
as where the evidence shows that, although accused was carrying a weapon at the time, he
was doing so merely as was his usual custom,
and not in anticipation of danger from deceased; . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, there was no evidence in the instant case that
the appellant was in any danger from the victim. The
appellant testified that he had not been in a fight with
the deceased, ( R. 249) and that he got along well with
the deceased and had no reason to expect trouble from
him. ( R. 301). The appellant further testified that
there were no angry words between himself and the deceased ·when he got out of the car. (R. 226). Further,
the appellant had had deceased take him home. If the
appellant were truly concerned about his own protection
why did he permit the decedent, a person whom he now
claims had reason to "fear", to take him home?
The appellant also cites People v. Moore, 43 Cal.
.517,

275 P. 2d 485 ( 1954) in his favor yet that case

is easily distinguished from the instant one. The Su·
preme Court of California in Moore held that refusal
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of defendants' requested instruction on the possible influence of antecedent threats by the 'l'ictim upon her
conduct in arming herself with a deadly weapon was
error. In the instant case, the victim did not make anv
threats upon the person or life of the appellant. On the
contrary, the appellant unequivocally testifies that he
got along well with the deceased and had no reason to
expect trouble from him.
In State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 141, 185 P. 2<l
738, ( 1947) this court held that requested instructions
by the defendant need not be given if they are unsupported by the evidence. See also State v. Newton, 105
Utah 553, 564 144 P. 2d 290 (1943). There was not
sufficient evidence in the instant case to justify an in·
struction on the right of one to arm himself in advance
if he anticipated a need for self-defense.
Appellant testified that he had carried a gun, a
tear gas derrigner, since his release from prison in
March of 1970 and that he always carried it loaded· (R.
304). The fact that appellant testified that he had been

assaulted July 31, 1970 (R. 286) is not sufficient evi· r
dence to warrant an instruction that he anticipated bodily harm and therefor had a right to arm himself

i11

advance. This is especially true where the appellant him·
self testified that he had no reason to expect trouble
from or fear the deceased, and that the deceased had

1
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threatened him. A right to arm instruction was
!ll'ither required nor appropriate under the factual circrnnsta11ces presented in the case at bar.

neYer

CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that the appellant, Jerry Lee Anderson, was properly convicted
of murder in the first degree. The appellants privilege
against self-incrimination was not violnted. There was
suf ficieut evidence to sustain the verdict and the court
did not error in failing to give appellant's requested instruction concerning the right to arm himself. The conriction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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Attorney General

DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
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